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ABSTRACT
STEPHANIE JABALEY: An Analysis of the Hurricane Insurance Markets in the
Southeastern United States
(Under the Direction of Andre Liebenberg)
As hurricanes are some of the most devastating natural catastrophes in the
United States, property insurance for coastal home and business owners is a
consistently evolving market. The southeast, specifically the Gulf of Mexico region,
is where most hurricanes are concentrated and has accumulated a large amount of
losses over the past few decades. After Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, less private
insurers have offered windstorm coverage for coastal property owners and the state
wind pools have increased their amounts of risk exposure. This thesis analyzes the
use of wind pools in the Gulf of Mexico, specifically Mississippi, and other residual
market tools to offer windstorm and flooding coverage for policyholders who aren’t
able to find coverage in the private market. It offers suggestions for improvement of
the residual markets and for increased participation by the private insurance market.
Coastal insurers have difficulty in charging rates that reflect the true cost of
risk of a hurricane occurring due to rate regulation. The NFIP also has similar issues
of paying out more in claims than it makes in premium, leaving it with an annual
underwriting loss. The state wind pools also tend to operate at underwriting losses.
depending on the state and the program’s structure. They also spread the hurricane
risk throughout the state to policyholders that aren’t affected by windstorms or flood.
To diffuse these problems, this thesis offers three solutions. First would be to
create a regional wind pool that would operate in the five Gulf of Mexico states:
Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana and Texas. There should also be a federal
government agency created to oversee and operate this wind pool. Secondly, the flood
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and windstorm markets should be merged to reduce wind versus water litigation. This
would involve reform of the current NFIP. Third, risk mitigation standards should be
structured through the government agency and transparent to policyholders. These
changes could improve coverage for policyholders and motivate more insurers to
enter the hurricane insurance market.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

With natural catastrophes that are as devastating as hurricanes are,
government programs and private insurers alike are faced with the question of how to
give relief to victims and rebuild coastal catastrophes without facing insolvency. This
past year, 2011, was the fifth costliest recorded year in history due to natural disasters
(Figure 1). Between the Japanese tsunami and flood. Hurricane Irene sweeping the
North American east coast, and hurricanes threatening the coast ofthe Philippines,
international insurers such as Zurich and Lloyd’s of London are faced with
unforeseen and expensive claims. The financial year of2012 started off grim due to
higher rates charged by underwriters, according to Marsh, a major insurance carrier
(Tougher US Commercial, 2011). While it is expected for markets to go through hard
and soft cycles, the natural catastrophe markets create infinite uncertainty that makes
it nearly impossible to predict future market cycles.
This thesis seeks to find a solution to increase the availability of affordable
windstorm and flood policies for those who cannot afford them. In order to reach this
recommendation, we must first answer the question of how policies sold by the
residual market can blend with the voluntary markets, specifically in Mississippi. It
will touch upon the legislative, economic and social effects that hurricanes have on
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communities as well as methods of risk financing used by the voluntary and residual
markets to decrease the severity of losses.
Hurricanes can easily be classified as the most devastating natural disasters in
the United States. According to a report by the Wharton Business School, storms and
floods were responsible for over 90% of economic losses worldwide between the
years of 1970 and 2004(Wharton, pi5.) Considering the deadly nature of other
natural disasters and even manmade disasters like terrorism, this number is
staggering.
With its diverse geography, the United States is exposed to a wide assortment
of natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornados and forest fires. However, none are
as costly as hurricanes. The states with coastal property on the Gulf of Mexico tends
to suffer the greatest losses due to windstorm and flood, yet Hurricane Irene showed
that the northern east coast is also exposed to hurricane losses as well. Figure 1 below
1

compares the monetary damages of different types of storms in the United States.
The number of exposures on coastal land has increased greatly in the past few
decades. Beachfront property is consistently increasing in value and people flock to
the seaside to retire. In Mississippi, the number of people living in a coastal area
increased by 84.8 percent from 1960 to 2008 when the US Census Bureau recorded
349,000 coastal residents. Along with an increasing number of people, the amount of
insured coastal property rose as to $51.8 billion in 2007, a $7.1 billion increase from
2004. These numbers rose after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which cost insurers in the

Source: The Property Claim Services(PCS)unit ofISO, a Verisk Analytics
company
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state of Mississippi alone $14 billion, not counting losses covered by the National
Flood Insurance Program”.
Figure 1; Inflation Adjusted U.S. Catastrophe Losses by Cause of Loss, 1991-2010^
(2010 $ billions)

Other'$1.3
0.4%
Fires'
$7.8
2.2%

Hurricanes arxl
tropical storms
$153.7
44.0%
Total:
$349.3 billion

Wind/Hail/Flood^
$14.2
4.1%
J
Geologic events
V
$1 7.8
5.1%
Terrorism
$23.8
6.8% Winter storms

Tornadoes*
$104.9
30.0%

$25.8
7.4%

It is undeniable that the intensity of hurricanes has increased within the past
decade. Of the ten most costly hurricanes in recorded United States history, eight of
the ten have occurred since 2005 (III, 2011.) These numbers can partially be
accredited to the aforementioned increase in property and communities on the coast.

^ Insurance Information Institute, Inc. Mississippi Hurricane Insurance: Fact File
2011, New York,
http://www.iii.org/articIes/mississippi-hurricane-insurance-fact-FiIe.htmI
^ (1) Adjusted for inflation by ISO using the GDP implicit price deflator. Excludes
catastrophes causing direct insured losses less than $25 million in 1997 dollars.
(2) Excludes snow.
(3) Does not include flood damage covered by the federally administered National
Flood Insurance Program.
(4) Includes wildland fires.
(5) Includes civil disorders, water damage, and non-property losses such as those
covered by workers compensation.
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Along with these changes, coastal weather patterns have also been evolving.
Although there may be a multiple year reprieve after a major storm, there is no way
of telling when another major storm will attack. For example, in 2006 and 2007(the
years following Hurricane Katrina) there were no severe hurricanes, but the 2008
hurricane season was a major source of losses. Devastating hurricanes like Katrina,
Irene and Wilma used to be more spread out, but recently it seems as if they have
been hitting frequently. Figure 2 shows that the magnitude of hurricanes in the United
States has slowly been increasing since the early 1980s.
th

Figure 2: Insured Losses Due To Insured Losses in the U.S. in 2011 Were The 5
Highest on Record, Exceeding $35 Billion"^
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While this chart shows that the cyclical nature of hurricanes can be
unpredictable, there are some social and economic changes that went along with these
high losses. Up until 1950, fishermen and small communities mostly occupied coastal
regions, so the losses suffered by large storms weren’t as costly. However, from the
Source: Miinchener Riickversicherungs-Gesellschaft, Geo Risks Research,
NatCatSERVICE. As of January 2012.
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1950s to the 1980s, coastal cities have grown and seaside properties have popped up
along the Gulf Coast. During this period of economic growth there were very few
hurricanes, therefore people didn’t buy as much insurance as they needed and weren’t
as considerate of building wind and flood proof buildings. When large storms began
to strike in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many ofthe losses were uninsured and
came out of homeowners’ pockets(Grace and Klein, 2009). It was during this time
period that states began assembling wind pool programs and finding alternative ways
to provide affordable coastal policies.
The insurance industry is consistently evolving as climate change occurs and
insurers must keep updated with the newest technology. For example. Risk
Management Services(RMS)released a new catastrophe model, version 11, in June
of 2011. This new model was approved in Florida and altered the state’s overall
expected losses for next year (Florida Approves RMS,2011). According to the
Insurance Journal, this new model is controversial with insurers. It includes updates
in “construction and roof types, higher inland wind speeds, heightened building
vulnerability, and increased losses due to storm surge,”(Simpson, 2011). However,
several companies have expressed concerns over the increased insured losses that the
new program predicts and are waiting for the program to be graded by ratings
companies(Simpson, 2011). This predictive software can have a large impact on the
insurance industry, as the new predicted rates will need to be acknowledged by rate
regulators if underwriters expect to adapt to the rates suggested by the software.
These rates are expected to be higher because ofthe predicted increased premiums.
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Because the software will require adaptation by both the industry and state
legislature, it a controversial topic.
Natural disasters and hurricanes in particular can have devastating effects on
the economies of the countries that they strike. As was previously mentioned, the year
of 2011 had the m.ost severe losses in recorded history. Because of the losses that
private insurers suffered, rates are increasing in the year of2012, according to Marsh.
These property rate increases for coastal homeowners have increased 10 percent and
more over the fourth quarter of 2011 and Marsh expects for their U.S. clients to
experience those increased rates in 2012 as well(Marsh, 2011.)
While this thesis will focus on the property losses suffered after a hurricane, it
should be acknowledged that the lives lost in storms have a large financial and
psychological significance as well. The media tends to focus on the social hardships
that follow a hurricane, which generally includes an increase in crime, looting and
death in general. Life insurance companies must pay out for a victim’s loss of
income, as well as death benefits to the surviving family members. Fortunately, with
the increase in storm tracking technology, cities are usually able to warn residents of
an approaching storm. Between the years of 1991 and 2011, an average of 95 people
died annually as a result from hurricanes. This number includes a large outlier of
1,518 deaths in 2007, the year that Katrina struck (Appendix 2). While this thesis
focuses on the property losses, the loss of life is far more devastating and is
unfortunately prevalent in the wake of hurricanes.
When a hurricane strikes a region, there are sociological effects along with the
physical and financial devastation. There is a loss of confidence in the region, as
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shown in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Especially for beachfront cities, the
slowdown of tourism has a huge effect on the local economy. Regions that
manufacture goods find their buyers purchasing the same product from competitors
during the rebuilding phase. Government money is poured into rebuilding cities and
the region can be left in financial distress. An initial reaction to a natural disaster can
be a downfall in the country’s stock. After the tsunami in Japan, the Nikkei Stock
Average dropped 1.7% the day that the tsunami struck, with stock prices plummeting
further as the devastation was fully revealed by the media(Kumar,2011). Businesses
and individuals suffer indirect losses such as loss of income and the cost of temporary
housing that basic insurance policies don’t necessarily cover. It is these social effects
that leave homeowners and business owners financially devastated after a natural
disaster.
These losses can be mitigated both through actions ofthe property owner as
well as of the insurance company. Despite the fact that increasing claims payouts
have driven several private insurers out ofthe coastal market, there are still several
insurers that sell windstorm coverage. The barriers that face these voluntary market
insurers will be discussed next.
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CHAPTER II: THE VOLUNTARY INSURANCE MARKET

In the voluntary market insurers settle on actuarially sound rates (within the
state regulated rate allowance) that allow them to charge a fair amount of premium
based on the risk exposure while still earning a profit. It is the law of large numbers
that allows insurers to accept some risky accounts that could potentially have large
losses. Insurers operate under the expectation that not all oftheir policyholders will
experience losses at the same time and the independence of exposures allows them to
diversify their risks. However, when a natural catastrophe is a potential threat.
insurers face the possibility of losing a lot of capital in one large, costly event due to
the accumulation of individual losses in one geographic area. This is the main reason
that the average admitted^ insurer (that is subject to rate regulation) won’t accept the
risk of windstorm policies.
The federal government created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 as a response to the dwindling
insurer market for flood insurance(NFIP,2001). More recently, after large losses
from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Ike in 2008, smaller insurers were
hesitant to write coastal property insurance. Even if the private markets were willing
to offer coastal coverage, it was at an increased rate that few homeowners could

^ An admitted insurer is a private insurance company that operates in the insurance
market
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afford. This exposure created problems with the coastal insurance market and it
heavily affected private insurers. This chapter will first discuss the effects of natural
catastrophes like hurricanes on private insurers, then specifically Mississippi insurers.
Next it will discuss the process of mitigation and protection of these insurers, as well
as an analysis of the market and recommendations for the future ofthe voluntary
market in coastal insurance.
Insurers have other options to finance, or transfer, this uncertain aggregate
risk such as reinsurance, diversification, and catastrophe bonds. Reinsurance is a risk
transfer mechanism that involves the primary insurer ceding some of its risk to a
reinsurer, which is essentially an insurance company for insurers. This risk transfer
solution is widely used in the case of large risks such as natural catastrophes. The
transfer works well for both parties, as the reinsui*er is able underwrite more policies
and the primary insurer gains a ceding commission from the reinsurer and retains less
risk (Grace and Klein, 2009). An excess-of-loss contract involves the primary insurer
retaining losses up to a certain limit, at which the reinsurer steps in and pays claims
past that limit(Trupin & Flitner, 2009). Diversification generally involves the insurer
writing policies that are in different lines of insurance, and/or in different geographic
areas. For example, an insurer generally won’t only write property insurance in one
specific region because if a tornado hits that region, all of their exposures are grouped
together and will experience one large loss. Another example of diversification is
pooling, which allows several insurers to pool their exposures together. While this
doesn’t necessarily reduce their risk, it allows them to better predict their losses.
Catastrophe bonds are another method of risk financing that allows the insurer to
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involve private investors in spreading the risk of catastrophes. These bonds will be
discussed further in Chapter III. These methods of risk financing allow for insurers to
reduce their changes of losing their surplus^ in one occurrence.
In high-risk exposure areas like Florida coastal counties, insurers take a huge
gamble when agreeing to insure coastal properties. There have been several examples
of companies “going for broke,” which means that after experiencing financial
distress, insurers write policies for as many coastal properties as possible (Grace and
Klein, 2009). This strategy is similar to the game of Russian roulette, as the insurer
hopes that the increase in premium will help even out its cash flows and that a
hurricane won’t strike so they won’t have to pay out claims. However, in Florida the
chances of this strategy succeeding are relatively slim. If the insurer is licensed in that
state, the other admitted insurers operating in that state will financially assist
policyholders through a guaranty fund if the responsible insurer becomes insolvent.
When the voluntary market determines pricing, rates are determined by what
is ‘actuarially sound.’ This number includes operating costs and profit margins, which
can make rates seem high to policyholders, especially during a time period without
major losses. However,the rate must also take into account the state’s regulation of
rates. If a state requires prior-approval, private insurers must apply to the state
insurance commission if they want to request a rate increase. This keeps the insurers
from increasing their rates without cause, but it also makes it difficult for private
insurers to charge rates that reflect the true risk that they are exposed to. According to

^ An insurer’s surplus is the excess capital that it retains from premium each year that
isn’t spent on claims, risk financing or overhead expenses. This capital is invested in
the hopes of increasing its value (Trupin and Flitner, 2009).
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basic economics, a competitive market will self-regulate as competition drives the
price down to an affordable level naturally.
As the insurance market approaches the end of a soft cycle (characterized by
low prices and high capacity) and the beginning of a hard one (high prices and low
capacity), policyholders wonder why prices are increasing during a time without
major hurricane losses. According to J. Robert Hunter, the director ofinsurance for
the Consumer Federation of America,“the property and casualty insurance industry
as a whole is significantly overcapitalized.”^ Consumers in the Florida insurance
market are concerned with rising property premiums, especially when there is an
absence of major losses and they believe that their insurers shouldn’t be raising
prices. Florida is an interesting example because so many homeowners get their
policy from the state windpool that few customers are left in the voluntary market.
To combat policyholders’ accusations of price gouging, USAA,a company in
the Florida market, commented on its Florida underwriting losses. In the past 10
Q

years, USAA has lost 6.4 cents for every dollar in Florida premium . This loss has not
changed in a favorable loss year, and they must raise their prices in order to make up
for those losses. After expensive hurricane seasons in 2004 and 2005, many standard
carriers left the Florida market. These carriers, like USAA,are facing risky exposures
and higher pricing is one of the only ways to compensate for the potential losses.

^ “No Storms, but Insurers Keep Socking it Away.” Palm Beach Post. Advisen FPN:
FPN Property. February 26, 2012.
http://propfpn.advisen.com/fpnHomepagep.shtml?resource_id=l68562036112995890
&userEmail=sjjabale@olemiss.edu#top
^ “No Storms, but Insurers Keep Socking it Away.” Palm Beach Post. Advisen FPN:
FPN Property. February 26, 2012.
http://propfpn.advisen.com/fpnHomepagep.shtml?resource_id=168562036112995890
&userEmail=sjjabale@olemiss.edu#top
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With low interest rates nationally, insurers struggle to obtain investment returns,
which makes underwriting profits even more necessary.
Rate regulation by the state government is a deciding factor of whether or not
an insurance carrier will offer coverage in that state. If a state’s rate isn’t what an
insurer considers actuarially sound, the insurer can potentially withdraw from the
market. For example, in 2008 State Farm decided that the homeowner’s maximum
rate in Florida was too low,so they filed for an increase ofthat rate. When the Florida
Office of Insurance Regulation denied State Farm that increase. State Farm threatened
to withdraw homeowner’s coverage from Florida despite the fact that they had 21%
of the market share, which was the largest in the state at that point(Grace and Klein,
2009). The Insurance Council, in turn, told State Farm that if they withdrew from the
homeowner’s market they had to withdraw their automobile coverage as well, which
made State Farm change its mind (Grace and Klein, 2009). This exchange is a good
example of what happens when a natural disaster, which was Hurricane Katrina in
this case, has such an effect on rate regulation that insurers aren’t able to profitably
operate in the state. While it should be expected that insurers have years of losses.
those operating in a state like Florida that suffers from severe hurricane season will
have more difficulty turning a profit when rates are highly regulated.
Like any other product, the supply and demand of insurance coverage tends to
change based on the financial markets, but in coastal areas demand is also dependent
on whether there has recently been a major storm. After a hurricane, demand tends to
increase while supply decreases because insurers (especially in the standard markets)
won’t want to write windstorm coverage. This trend is shown by the growth of

12

residual markets, like in Florida. After Hurricane Katrina the supply ofcoverage in
the admitted market in Florida dropped so homeowners were forced to get their
policies from the residual markets(Grace and Klein, 2009). However, insurers that
remain in the market after a major storm and continue to offer windstorm coverage
can benefit from an increase in rates. Hurricane-prone markets are extremely
unpredictable, which causes an insurer’s profitability to be volatile as well. While
insurers are able to handle the occasional hurricane, seasons like 2004 and 2005
where major storms hit the Gulf Coast back to back can deplete an insurer’s surplus
quickly.
One of the advantages of the voluntary market is that policyholders are
motivated to practice risk mitigation in order to potentially minimize loss severity.
The private insurers are also driven to encourage risk mitigation through policy
discounts, because the less severe the claims are, the less the insurer needs to pay out
in losses. The money saved from reduced loss payouts can also be spent on more risks
mitigation programs and protection. Large companies that employ Chief Risk
Officers(CROs)and Risk Managers benefit from the implementation of risk
mitigation programs, such as programs that educate employees on official evacuation
procedures in the event of a sudden storm. When a company implements a program
like this, its insurer will likely reduce the premiums that the company pays based on
reduced historical losses. However,if a company has poor historical loss runs and is
insured by the residual market, the rates are so high that the incentive to reduce losses
is less prevalent.
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It isn’t just the policyholders and insurers who suffer financial losses in the
wake of a windstorm and flood. There are many parties that are involved with disaster
relief and rebuilding that are heavily involved in the mitigation process. It is this
involvement that creates an incentive for risk mitigation to be embedded in the
parties’ practices. First of all, construction agencies and their employed parties are
tasked with rebuilding homes and commercial buildings after a storm, which can be
difficult if new legislation updates building structure codes. Construction companies
are required to file whether a home is built by an earthquake fault line, and real estate
agencies are required to inform homeowners of this information under the Alquist
Priolo Act(Wharton, p7.) This practice not only increases knowledge of potential
natural disasters but also allows homeowners to evaluate whether they can afford
earthquake premiums tacked on to the price of a home.
Another step in the process of buying a home for most individuals is taking
out a mortgage or a loan on that property. This step is part of the risk mitigation
process as the bank or financial institution that provides that loan generally requires
that the homeovmer purchase insurance. Few people can afford to purchase a home
without a loan, so this rule enforces the purchase ofinsurance, which is a form of risk
transfer. After Hurricane Katrina many homeowners realized that their flood policies
with the NFIP had lapsed, leaving them without coverage. Since then there has been a
push to enforce homeowners living in flood zones to have updated policies. In order
to get a policy from the Mississippi wind pool, it is required for the applicant to show
proof offlood insurance. These steps were necessary in enforcing risk mitigation. The
state and federal governments also establish building codes that make homes and
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businesses more resilient during storms. This practice reduces damages to buildings,
which is a form of risk mitigation as well.
However, building codes aren’t the same in every state and aren’t regulated
consistently either. A recent study by the Insurance Institute for Business and Home
Safety analyzing building codes for coastal states ranked Mississippi last out of 18
states. The reason for this poor ranking is because there is currently no regulation of
building codes in existence and there is no statewide consistency in the building
codes. It is up to the counties to hire inspectors to regulate homes and businesses and
only one out of the six southernmost counties in Mississippi does this(Altman,2012).
Alabama was also ranked low on the list, although still higher than Mississippi, at
15^*^ out of 18. However, wind resistant buildings are a concern in Alabama all across
the state, and not just in coastal region. In that past two years, several counties in
Alabama have been ravaged by tornadoes. As property owners set out to rebuild, they
will find themselves with tougher building codes, according to Rep. Steve McMillan,
R-Gulf Shores(Study Says Alabama, 2012). Similar to Mississippi, Alabama also
finds it difficult for counties to enforce the inspection of construction. Until these
states can start enforcing the building codes, they will not be followed and vnll not be
nearly as effective as they should be.
The National Institute of Building Scientists(NIBS)is the organization that
creates codes nationally, but they tend to set the standards lower than they should be
for coastal states (Altman, 2012). The NIBS also doesn’t consider climate change a
factor for updating building codes due to political issues. This will eventually lead to
a game of catch up where the codes are continually behind natural disasters. The issue
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of building codes has turned into a political battle, as officials from the construction
industry are opposed to statewide building codes because it would make building new
homes more costly in an industry that is already suffering from the financial crisis.
However, the other side of that argument is that owners of buildings constructed to
withstand high winds and floods generally pay less insurance premium on that
building. This makes the house more affordable overall despite potential higher
building costs.
Under the Broad and Basic Coverage Forms ofthe Business Personal Property
(BPP) policy, there is coverage for windstorm and hail as well as very limited
coverage for water. However, insurers have the ability to change coverage forms
based on the geographic location, so it is common for insurers to exclude windstorm
and water coverage in coastal areas that are prone to hurricanes(Krohm & Roeder
p208). Most businesses are able to find coverage in the excess and surplus lines(nonadmitted) market to serve their property insurance needs, but the rates tend to be
higher than in the admitted markets. Homeowners, on the other hand, generally
purchase the H03, which is the standard property policy for residential property
ovmers. Like the BPP,the H03 generally covers windstorm but in areas on the coast
it is generally excluded. Unlike business owners, homeowners are generally less able
to purchase property coverage from excess and surplus insurers because the rates are
generally out of their price range. This is the reason that many homeowners turn to
the residual market. In Mississippi alone, residential policyholders account for 94%
of all risks in the residual market(Appendix 4). This inability to find homeowners
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coverage outside of the residual market is one ofthe main issues that will be
addressed in this thesis.
It was mentioned earlier that the NFIP is the main coverage provider for flood
in the United States. It is common for property owners in coastal areas to have
windstorm coverage either from an insurer in the voluntary market or their states
wind pool as well as a flood policy from the NFIP. This creates a substantial problem
after a major hurricane, such as Hurricane Katrina, where it is difficult to determine
which damage is result of wind and which is a result offlooding. Mississippi and
Louisiana homeowners complained that after Katrina they would go between their
coverage providers, each telling the policyholder that the other provider was
responsible for their claim (Grace and Klein, 2009). This was not only poor claims
handling and unfair to the policyholder, but it also created litigation and costly tests to
try to find the source of damages. Some form of collaboration of wind and water
coverage could potentially save the government a large amount of money and could
also benefit the voluntary market by eliminating costly lawsuits.
After suffering large claims payouts after major hurricanes. Travelers
Insurance Group decided to invest in research to find a solution to the wind versus
water claims and the voluntary versus residual market issues. CEO of Travelers, Jay
Fishman,\vrote an Op-Ed piece for the Wall Street Journal requesting changes to the
way that hurricane catastrophe insurance coverage works(Fishman, 2007). The
Travelers Institute came to the conclusion that private market collaboration with no
government subsidies would best serve policyholders. The main goal of this
conclusion is to “spread the risk among as many people as possible who are subject to
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that same risk,” (Travelers Institute, p6). It must be considered that this is from the
perspective of an active member of the voluntary market. Travelers has an interest in
improving the insurance regulatory market because alterations to the status quo could
potentially help it as a company.
The Travelers Coastal Wind Zone Plan consists offour main principles; a
consistent regulatory environment, premium transparency, a federal reinsurance
program and an increase in risk mitigation programs (Travelers Institute p5). The
Travelers Institute is a proponent of having government involvement in the insurance
market but for its role to be in rate regulating as v^ell as overseeing underwriting.
Another main point of the Coastal Wind Zone Plan is to keep the risk constricted to
homeowners exposed to windstorm (Travelers Institute p6). Currently, through wind
pools, essentially an entire state subsidizes the risk of coastal residents. Part of a
Tupelo, Mississippi homeowner’s insurance premium will be paid to the wind pool
through the insurer’s statutory contribution, assisting in a homeowner living on the
Gulf Coast to pay a lower premium. This is a principle that the Travelers Institute
believes is unfair. Part of this plan includes higher premiums for coastal residents.
In Jay Fishman’s letter he mentioned that the insurance market would function
more smoothly as a market-based entity (Fishman, 2007). Although the article is
slightly outdated, it is still applicable to the market today, five years after it was
written. The way that the voluntary market fimctions today created the need for a
government based insurance market to operate as a “market of last resort.” This
market is called the residual insurance market, which v^ll be explained in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER III: THE RESIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET

As was discussed previously, the past two decades have shown a drastic
increase in the severity of natural catastrophes. It is a result of this trend that many
members of the voluntary market have started to exclude wind and water coverage
and these policies have shifted to the excess and surplus markets, as well as to
reinsurers. When these insurers leave the market, the supply for policies decreases.
causing prices to increase. As a result, state insurance departments have tightened
down on rate regulation for the remaining admitted insurers. When rates are highly
regulated, insurers are less able to charge rates that reflect true risk (Grace and Klein,
2009). States regulate rates because they want everyone to have access to insurance.
but combined with market trends, insurers are still leaving the catastrophe market. It
is a result of the combination of these factors that states create residual markets.
A residual insurance market is a term to describe any state-sponsored
program that assists an individual or business in obtaining insurance coverage ifthey
are unable to purchase a policy from a private insurer within the voluntary market.
These programs vary greatly from state to state and are used for most types of
insurance, from workers compensation to personal auto policies(Grace and Klein,
2009). For the purposes of this thesis, only windstorm and flood property policies will
be analyzed. Residual markets are one way that the government and the voluntary
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market have w orked together to ensure that coastal property owTiers are able to find
coverage. The structure of the residual insurance program depends on the state but
they typically involve the government (funded by ta.xpayers) subsidizing the program
in some w'ay. Many programs also require the involvement of private insurers and
essentially organize their underwTiting as a group. The methods that wall be discussed
include the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements(FAIR) Plait and wind pools, as
well as the use of catastrophe bonds as a risk financing mechanism.
The residual market is a w'ay to catch the risks that the voluntary market can’t
retain. Like any other insurance market, it depends on the law of large numbers to
keep from becoming insolvent. When a market is saturated with similar risks, it has a
higher chance of having its surplus capital wiped out in one occtin'ence. The residual
market has offset that risk through alternate risk financing, like purchasing
reinsurance and issuing catastrophe bonds. These financing mechanisms act as an
insurance policy for the insurers and make the catastrophe market more appealing.
The FAIR plans originated when residents of major cities were faced with
high premium for coverage of buildings located in dangerous neighborhoods due to
riots in the 1960s. Low-income families were forced to pay high premiums for risks
such as burglary and vandalism that were unmanageable. President Lyndon Johnson
declared that all citizens have a right to property insurance, and therefore assisted in
the creation of the FAIR plans. The program is structured so that it is governed by
state and underwrites property/casualty policies for business owners and
homeowners. Similar to the stmcture of wind pools, each admitted insurer in the state
has a portion of the risk that is based off their percent of market share in that state. In
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order to keep rates atlordable the government assists the insurers financially, thus
subsidizing the program. Once the program was established it quickly spread from
urban residences to rural areas of the country. It is used both in California for homes
susceptible to brushfires and on the coast for regions subject to hurricanes. This idea
of government-subsidized risk found a place in large cities and has spread to its
current state of providing coastal coverage as well (Krohm and Roeder, p2).
Today, FAIR plans focus on coastal insurance along with its urban policies,
while the Beach and Windstorm Plan offers wind coverage in coastal zones. With the
growing risk of natural catastrophes, FAIR plans have experienced extreme growth.
According to a Lloyd’s of London report, FAIR and Beach & Windstomis Plans
increased from 931,550 to 2.8 million policies between 1990 and 2010 (Lloyd’s,
2011). This 200% increase has created a remarkable increase in exposure as well.
During the time period of 1990 to 2010 exposure has also increased from $54.7
billion to $757.9 billion, a 1,285% increase (Lloyd’s, 2011). This exposure to risk has
gotten to the point where the amount of capital pooled by the private insurers may not
be able to cover one large single disaster. If that were the case, the government would
need to cover the excess losses past the point that the private insurers could handle.
This would inevitably lead to taxpayers bailing out these programs, putting the
property owner’s risk indirectly back into the hands of that property owner.
There is little synchronization between the states that have an operating FAIR
plan. For example, in February of 2004, the state of Texas requested a 12% increase
in average state rates. This request was to increase the adequacy of the rates charged
to policyholders and took place only a year after the program was implemented in
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Texas\ However, in the same year in California, Insurance Commissioner John
Garamendi requested an ease of the FAIR Plan requirements so that more of his
constituents would be able to gain access to policies'®. The reason for the
fragmentation is the geographic difference between the states. While Texas suffers
windstorm and flooding damages from hurricanes, California is more prone to
wildfires. It wouldn’t make much sense to synchronize the rates between these two
states, but there could be potential for regional collaboration with the Gulf of Mexico
states. Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida tend to suffer the same
natural disasters and could financially benefit from collaboration. This principle will
be discussed further later in this thesis.
The FAIR Plan currently operates in 30 states, and its exposures per state vary
widely (Krohm and Roeder, p2). Flowever, one common factor is that every state has
operated at an underwriting loss in almost every year since the program started. One
problem is that the FAIR program began to cover commercial risks instead ofjust
residential. The whole point of the program was to relieve homeowners of their
personal financial burdens. While the program is still mostly composed of private
residents, there is a small percent of business participants(Krohm and Roeder, p3).
Another problem is the growth of the program. The residual markets for wind and
water coverage has grown rapidly as natural disasters have become more and more
catastrophic. The programs are at such a size where they consistently must seek

^ “Texas FAIR Plan Requesting 12% Statewide Average Rate Increase.” Insuranee
Advocate. February 2, 2004.
‘® “California: Garamendi Eases FAIR Plan Requirements; More Californians to Gain
Access.” Insurance Advocate. October 25, 2004.
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reinsurance, which can be \'er>- costly. The FAIR programs have experienced a shift
from its original purpose of helping low income citizens find coverage.
As a risk financing method, the role of catastrophe bonds is important in the
issuance of coastal property insurance. They offer investors the opportunity to
essentially bet that a major catastrophe won't occur before the maturity of the bond.
Catastrophe bonds can potentially offer high returns and help diversify the portfolio
of the owner. However, along with the potential return is a high risk. Catastrophe
bonds can be more expensive than reinsurance, which is why they are not as
commonly utilized. They are occasionally viewed as too risky and too expensive to
assess (Catastrophe Insurance Risks, p3).
The structure of a catastrophe bond is far more complex than the purchase of
reinsurance. The insurer (or reinsurer) must issue the bond through a Special Purpose
Reinsurance Vehicle (SPRV), where investors can purchase the bond. This process is
shown by the flowchart located in Appendix 10. The way that the bond then works is
that if the specified catastrophe occurs before the bond comes to maturity, the insurer
no longer pays back the principal or the remaining interest. Bondholders are issued
interest, like any other bond, and it tends to be higher than other bonds because of the
high risk. This interest is funded by premiums earned by the insurer. If the specified
event does not occur, the insurer must pay the principal payment as well as interest at
the maturity date (Catastrophe Insurance Risks, pi0-11).
Catastrophe bonds have been emerging in the past few years as a risk
financing mechanism. They are a vehicle of pooling risk and a way that private
insurers can diversify their portfolio by adding additional risk. Wind pools have
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started to use catastrophe bonds as well as insurance carriers. Louisiana recently
became the third residual market program to use catastrophe bonds. The Louisiana
state wind pool issued $100 million worth of securities through Pelican Re Ltd., a
Cayman Islands-based facility. According to Out of the Stomi News,“these bonds
provide three years of indemnity coverage for hurricanes,"(Lelunann, 2012). The use
of catastrophe bonds is a positive move into involving the capital markets in
diversifying humcane risk.
Because post-huiTicane flooding can result in costly claims(and isn’t typically
covered by wind pools or any voluntary carriers) the federal government created the
NFIP. Insurance carriers in the voluntary market no longer carry flood policies and
homeowners who live in a potential flood zone must go to the government program to
get flood coverage. The NFIP has a positive impact on communities because it not
only pays out claims to policyholders following a flood but it also assists
communities in improving buildings so they won’t be as easily affected by floods.
The program identifies and maps flood zones, analyzes levee systems, updates the
flood maps and maps potential future conditions(NFIP, 2001). The federal
government, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA),funds all
of this.
The NFIP has two different programs: Emergency and Regular Programs. The
limits for the emergency program for businesses are lower than the regular program,
at $100,000 compared to $500,000 for building and contents. Communities must
agree to participate in construction and alterations programs, as well as to enforce
community floodplain management. The NFIP General Property form is different
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from the standard commercial property form in se\'eral ways. First of all, theNFIP
only offers actual cash \ alue coverage, it doesn’t offer coinsurance and it can’t be
written on a blanket basis. This means that policyholders can potentially recover less
than they would otherwise and they aren't able to put blanket coverage on multiple
exposures. The policy also excludes indirect losses, losses that have already occurred
or are in progress and earthquakes (Trtipin & Flitner p210).
While the NFIP can be beneficial to policyholders as well as their
communities and relieves insurers of the losses associated with floods, it can also be a
source of confusion that leads to litigation. When a major hun'icane like Katrina or
Andrew hits, the damages are so severe that it can be difficult to discern whether the
losses are a result of wind damage or flooding. The situation of windstomi causing a
flood is also a problem that the NFIP and windstorm carriers face. For example, after
Hurricane Katrina, policyholders were unable to tell whether damages were the direct
result of flooding or whether that flooding was indirectly caused by the wind breaking
down the levees (Travelers Approach, p6). This problem is escalated when a
homeowner has wind coverage but not flood coverage because there is a chance that
they would not be able to recover for their losses at all if the court deems that the
damage is flood based.
In the United Kingdom, flood risk is handled much differently than in the
United States. Instead of a government-subsidized risk program like the NFIP, the
UK has enlisted private insurers to agree to provide residential flood insurance. In
exchange for the voluntary market absorbing the risk, the government has agreed to
provide risk mitigation services similar to those that the NFIP offers, like flood
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mapping, grants for at-risk areas and community building programs. The government
also gives a certain amount of subsidy, but much less than the NFIP offers. This
allows for actuarially sound rates to be charged. According to the Lloyds report, the
UK program is unlikely to last long, despite it being a good idea. The government is
currently not upholding the risk mitigation end of the bargain to the private insurers'
standards. This creates a break in the agreement, and is the reason that the program
will probably not be renewed after 2013 (Lloyds, p21).
This UK flood program is a good idea in principle and could potentially work
in the United States. Because the government is already offering risk mitigation
services through the NFIP. it would only cut its losses by stopping the provision of
policies. The NFIP is losing so much money by offering flood coverage for such low
premiums that cutting that part of the program could only help the government. There
is no competition with the government, which would incite private carriers to reenter
the flood market. According to the Lloyd's report, this action would “support the
continued provision of coverage and risk based premiums by mitigating risks'
(Lloyds, p23).
The NFIP is cuiTently facing financial strain and is in need of reform. In a
report by the General Accounting Office released in 2010, it was stated that the NFIP
owes the Federal Treasury $18.8 billion (Lloyds, plO). One oftheNFIP’s major
setbacks is that it is unable to adjust its rates to make them actuarially sound. The
same report stated that the rates charged by the NFIP only reflect a third of the true
risk that the NFIP is retaining. Its modeling systems are out of date and, unlike the
wind pools, the NFIP does not transfer its risk thi'ough reinsurance. All of these
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factors could polcntiall>' contribule to an approaching end to the NFIP, or at least a
downsizing of the program, which cuiTently services the majority of flood zones in
the United States.
I'he residual market in the United States would benefit from refomi. As the
NFIP comes up for renewal in 2013. the legislature will have the opportunity to alter
the program to either extend its funding or to cut back on its services. While the
services provided, such as flood mapping and building communities to be more floodresistant, are beneficial, the program is losing money through its policies. It would
benefit the private markets and the policyholders if flood policies w'ere offered by the
state wind pools and even the excess-surplus markets. This could increase the capital
running through the private markets and would spread the risk more evenly. The
NFIP is unable to diversify its risks, while the private market has the advantage of
being more selective. The wind pool could also handle water risks better than the
NFIP. Depending on the state program, wind pools are effective mechanisms for
transferring risks.
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CHAPTER IV: STATE RUN WIND POOLS

The five states that border the Gulf of Mexico are some of the most exposed
to catastrophe in the country. According to a study done by the Insurance Services
Organization (ISO), Florida, Texas and Louisiana made up 37.3% ofinflation
adjusted catastrophe losses between 1980 and 2010(Appendix 3). This percentage is
extremely high for only three states, and these high losses are accompanied by high
homeowners’ insurance premiums. Premiums in the southeastern states have been
steadily increasing, and even spiking in some years (see Figure 3). Note that in 2002,
the year of Hurricane Lili that caused $30 million worth of damage to Mississippi,
premiums in the state spiked, nearly doubling from $700 to $1200 (III Mississippi,
2011). According to Property Casualty 360, recent rate increases indicate that
unexpectedly high weather-related losses are gaining traction,”(Ruquet, March
2012). It is these increases in homeowners’ premium that makes it even more
necessary for the Gulf of Mexico states to pioneer the wind pool system.
Within recent years, wind pools have been a popular market for coastal
homeowners to insure their property at a lower rate than through the private market.
After major catastrophes in their states, legislators acknowledged the need for a
government-sponsored pool offering affordable and reliable policies to their
constituents. Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, Louisiana and Florida all have their own
different systems that accommodate the needs of their respective states. The
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struclures vary based on the amount of coastal exposure in each state, and not all have
been equally successful. For the purposes of this paper, the Mississippi and Florida
programs, structures and successes will be compared at further length than the other
states.
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Flomeowners Premium Trends:
2002Q1 -2007Q1
ibDJ T
""
—

II

F.
» LA
* f.'S
— SC

1-103

~x
ii;oo

u
TTr

«
A

'A—
— *'
-

. .-A'
-A ' ■

/
bOD

■7

,-A

y

7^

—A ■
A

A—

i
bOd

X

r-

●iOO
C2G\ C2G2 0203 020-^ 030^ 03Q2 0303 030-*. 0-5Q1 04Q2 0-'.C3

CbOl C5C2 0503 0:^O^ 060\ 0602 0603 0604

First of all, a wind pool is a function of the residual mai'ket, meaning that a
bill from the state’s legislature enacts it. All of the operating insurers in that state
must contribute an amount to the wind pool based on the percent of the market that
they hold in that state. In order to obtain a policy from the wind pool, a homeowner
must first go through a local insurance agent. With that agent, the homeowner will
fill out a policy application that is generally accompanied with an inspection of the
property exposure. It depends on the state but most wind pools do not require proof of
rejection from the standard market, so that step is not included in the process. For
11

Source: PCIAA/ISO Fast Track Monitoring System; authors’ calculations.
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more information on the process of obtaining a policy from a wind pool, refer to the
flowchart in Appendix 1 1 .
In this discussion the Mississippi Windstorm Underwaiting Association
(MWUA)will be compared to the Alabama Insurance Undeiwriting Association
(AIUA). Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA), Louisiana Citizens
Property Insurance Corporation (LCPIC) and the Florida Citizen's Propert)' Insurance
Corporation (FCPIC). Speculations of the future of wind pools in the southeast and
on the Gulf Coast will also be made, as well as recommendations for the
improvement of these wind pools.
While the five wind pools compared were all founded with the same general
purpose, they each serve their respective states with different operating systems
because each state's coastal exposure and political environment differs from the next.
Government support for the wind pools vary greatly in different states. Some
programs are forced to charge rates that don’t reflect the actual risk of loss, while
other states have a requirement to charge higher rates than the private market.
Louisiana and Mississippi go as far as to discourage submissions for wind pool
coverage because it is portrayed as the market of last resort. Most of the programs are
attempting to implement risk mitigation programs, which would be helpful with
lowering exposure(GAO p3).
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Alabama has been supported by the AIUA since the early 1970N but it was
formed on a voluntary basis in coordination with the Department of Insurance. It
wasn’t until after Murricane Katrina that the state legislation “codified the AIUA
along with its articles of agreement, plan of operation, and rules and procedures” in
2008 (AIUA, 2011). Participation from insurance agencies is based on the percent of
market share that the company writes in counties on the gulf coast. The AIUA
charges actuarially sound rates so that it is able to afford premiums for reinsurance
that will cover the maximum probable loss. However, the AIUA is able to offer lower
premiums than the voluntary market because “the program has no cost of capital for
retained risk,” according to program officials (GAO, p23). The plan also has a credit
system for homeowners that invest in risk mitigation teclmiques such as

complying

with building codes and implementing early warning systems. The credit system and

Source: GAO Analysis
^Florida- Catastrophe fund is a reinsurance fund
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low rates both encourage participation in the residual market in Alabama as opposed
to the voluntar\- market, which hurts pri\ ate insurers.
Louisiana empkw s a \ ery different system than Alabama. The state legislature
requires that the LCPIC charge a rate that is 10% higher than the most expensive rate
offered by private insurers. This generally means that the LCPIC rate is closer to tlie
actuarially sound rate as well. Unlike the AIU.A. the LCPIC purposefully discourages
public participation by charging a high rate and marketing itself as the insiu'er of last
resort. Another way that the LCPIC encourages pri\’ate market participation is
through its grant system for insurers in the voluntary market(GAO p32). The LCPIC
has provided between $2 million and $10 billion to private insurers in exchange for
their assuming of policies previously held by the LCPIC. This grant is based on the
amount of volume of policies that the insurer has issued in the private property
market. This decreased the LCPICs total exposure by over $9 billion, greatly
decreasing their risk(GAO p33). The Louisiana program is similar to Alabama as it
also offers incentives for policyholders to invest in risk mitigation through a credit
system.
The wind pool in Texas is slightly more intricate than the other states’
programs. Like the AIUA, TWIA offers rates that do not reflect the true cost of the
risk that they provide coverage for, making premiums more competitive than the
voluntary market premiums. In 2009, the Texas state legislature adjusted the TWIA
ratemaking structure. It now allows new rating territories and promotes the use of
catastrophe modeling for determining rates. The legislative changes also apply to
private insurers, who can now raise rates by 5% per year without applying for the
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change through the Insurance Commissioner. In the wake of a catastrophe, insurers
can increase rates up to 10° o without submitting an application(GAO p40).
'fhese changes encourage pri\'ate insurers to offer windstorm insurance so
that TWIA is the market of last resort. They also limit the amount of loss that TWIA
retains after a single loss, which is capped at S2.5 billion. This was the amount of
losses after the 2008 hurricane season, which prompted the legislature to create tlte
rule to cap losses. I Io\vc\ er. the law does not state who would cover the losses in
excess of $2.5 billion (GAO, p41). This lack of detail could create major problems in
i‘
the case of a devastating hurricane season. TWIA has piuchased $636 million in
reinsurance protection Irom over 47 different compaities(TWIA Press Release,
2011). This reinsurance structure could potentially cover a large amount of losses in
the event of a loss but the legislative structure of the TWIA would need to be altered
to make sure that a plan is secured in writing.
The wind pool in Florida is a unique example, as it is a “not-for-profit,taxexempt government corporation to provide state-backed insurance coverage ”(GAO
pi 3). Unlike any of the other gulf coast states, Florida has a primary insurer FCPIC
as well as the Florida HuiTicane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF), which is a reinsurer The
CPIC insures more than 1.4 million people, which is a large percent of Florida’s
coastal population. It was recorded in September of2007 as having over $506 billion
in coverage, making it Florida’s largest insurer, holding 18% of market share in the
admitted market(Sigma 2008, pi4).
The rates charged by CPIC were legislatively frozen from eaidy 2007 to the
beginning of 2010. This rate also included a loading charge to make up for CPIC’s
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deficit caused by the storm season of 2006. While this extra charge meant that
policyholders were paying more, the premium was still less than premium in the
voluntary market. Starting January 1, 2010, the CPIC started allowing rate increases
that would begin to bring the rate closer to reflecting the tme cost ofrisk. With a
maximum of 10% increase in rate per year, it will take CPIC between 4 and 5 years to
reach their goal of increasing rates 45%(GAO,p28).
Florida Citizens also has a unique method of increasing participation in the
private market. The CPIC has started placing policies with private insurers, placing
over 3850,000 policies with 14 insurers in 2008. However,there has been concern
that those insurers don’t have adequate surplus to cover the potential losses ofthose
policies. The intent of this placement is to lessen the risk that the CPIC faces as the
largest coastal insurer in the state of Florida(GAO p28).
Another way that Florida’s system is unique is its system to increase
mitigation. While other states have a points system to encourage outfitting homes to
withstand natural disasters, Florida also provides outreach and education for its
homeowners. Because Florida is a peninsula, it has much more coastal exposure than
any of the other southeastern states. Hurricanes affect a larger portion of its
population compared to other states, so the state must spend more to encourage risk
mitigation. The CPIC offers over $740 million each year in discounts for
policyholders that earn mitigation credits. The system still has room for improvement,
as the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss reported in Febmary 2012 that the
current system has created many complaints from private insurers that are unable to
profitably operate in the state of Florida(GAO p29).
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I louse Bill 1500, also known as the "Mississippi Economic Growth and
Redevelopment Act ol 2007" created the Mississippi Windstonn UnderwTiting
Association. 1 he goal of the MWUA was to offer affordable windstorm insurance to
homeowners living in the Gulf Coast region that were suffering from constantly rising
rates alter Hurricane Katrina. The bill states that its purpose is "to stimulate the
economic growth and rcde\ elopmcnt wathin all areas of the state by promoting the
availability of affordable commercial and residential casualty loss insurance,’'(House
Bill 1500, 2007.) Mississippi has seen an increase of 495% in total exposure to loss
since 2005, whieh made the need for a well-run wind pool apparent(GAO, p2). The
MWUA is seen throughout the industry as a solid model for an efficiently run wind
pool.
The Mississippi wind pool has a state government and legislative body that
are supportive of its actions. Unlike any of the other wand pool programs in the gulf
coast region, the Mississippi government subsidizes rate reductions, so the rate
offered by the MWUA isn’t aetuarially sound but it is still able to operate profitably.
When the MWUA requested to raise property rates in both personal and commercial
lines, the government instead provided an $80 million subsidy to keep the rates low
for policyholders. In the six counties closest to the coast, participation in MWUA is
about 60%(GAO, p32). This number isn’t too surprising because the low rates ai’e
enticing for homeowners who can’t afford the rates in the voluntary market. Harrison
and Jackson counties have the two highest participation rates, with limits of 3.5
billion and 2.1 billion respectively (Appendix 8). The two counties, along with
Hancock County, are the southernmost counties in Mississippi and are the three that
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border the Gulf of Mexico (Appendix 5). The suiplus lines market in Mississippi
generally insures eommereial properties, as only 6% of the MWUA’s policies are
commercial (Appendix 4).
The MWUA's Board of Directors is made up of agents and under\\Titers that
donate their time to the wind pool to make sure that it is running smootlily. The
policies are issued per > ear and must be renewed annually. The wind pool hires an
agency that inspects the houses to make sure that they are up to building codes. It was
mentioned previously that Mississippi does not have statewide building codes but the
MWUA uses its own set of standards. Around half of the houses insured by the
MWUA are Masonry Veneer while the other half is Frame (Appendix 7). The
MWUA operates on its Rules and Procedures, which state how the organization
operates based off of 1TB1500. For example, the MWUA does not accept policy
application when a named storm is showing up on stonn radars and is about to hit one
of the six covered counties. A rule that makes Mississippi different from other states
is that participating insurers can get recoupment, meaning that they are partially
reimbursed in a year without severe losses. This further provides incentives for
insurance carriers to participate in the program, because otherwise they would be
losing money by participating'^.
While it is important that homeowners and business owners can access
affordable policies through state programs, the state must find equilibrium in order to
not put admitted private insurers out of business. Many of these programs are starting

13

Mississippi Windstorm Underwidting Association, World Wide Web:
http://www.msplans.com/MWUA/
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to show trends of attempts at reducing capacity. Several of the wind pools have also
purchased large amounts of reinsurance recently. This could be the result of fear of a
major storm wiping out the wind pool's surplus and leaving the state in debt. The
private insurers only pa>' losses to the extent that they were originally assessed, and in
some cases, an cmergenev- assessment. This leaves the state government to cover the
rest of the losses past that limit, which is usually very high and wouldn't be reached
unless a monumental storm hits.
In most states, the wind pools do not exist to compete with the voluntary
market. Most private carriers have been portrayed as the enemy in the past few years
in the wake of major storms like HuiTicanes Katrina and Irene. Policyholders were
upset when their claims were either rejected or the payouts were less than they
expected and turned to suing the insurers. Cutthroat litigation resulted in hard feelings
against insurers in the standard market, forcing them out of the windstorm insurance
market (Grace and Klein, 2007). Because there are so few carriers willing to insure
coastal properties, there is little competition left for the wind pools.
The problem with the wind pools at the moment is that in some cases, they are
unintentionally limiting market competition (Kousky, 2010). The wind pools also
spread hurricane risk to insurer’s other policyholders in the state that aren’t exposed
to windstorm risk (Traveler’s Institute, 2010). While

there are few carriers willing to

offer windstorm insurance, it has gotten to the point where even if they wanted to sell
coastal policies, they wouldn’t be able to compete with the wind pool prices At this
point, there has to be some sort of regional cooperation as well as cooperation
between the residual and voluntary markets.
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CONCLUSION

Losses resulting from hurricanes ha^■e accounted for 44% of total losses due to
natural disasters in the past decade (Appendix 1). It can’t be ignored that hurricanes
are some of the most deadly disasters to hit mankind in recorded history. It is because
of this that hurricane coverage legislation is at the forefront of insurers and
legislatures priorities list. The insurance market affects property owTiers and the
government entities that represent them because if insurers have problems with
pricing or covering claims, it will negatively impact the policyholders. Windstorm
and flood coverage are high risk and high claims policies

that most homeowners will

need now that coastal regions in the United States are becoming more populated
Private insurers have begun to reject coastal property policies because of the
high risk, high frequency and severity of tropical storms, and the difficulty of
charging an actuarially sound rate due to regulation. The downside of the private
market for policyholders is that they are implicitly taxed due to the insurer’s
for poor risks. If an insurer underwrites coastal property,

coverage

they must raise the prices fo

all the policies that they have underwritten to compensate for the increased ri
ri sk,
meaning that inland property owners must pay more to subsidize coastal
owners. This implicit tax makes the private mai’kets

prop erty

less appealing to policyholde

While these wind pool program have been successful in the past few
years,
especially in Mississippi, there is still room for improvement. If the five Gulf of
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Mexico states could pool their policies and their risk, it could diversify their risks and
broaden their exposures. While all five states are prone to hurricanes, it rarely
happens that all are se% erely damaged by a single occurrence. This would be a good
way of making sure that hurricane risks are restricted to policyholders that are
affected by windstorms like the Travelers Institute recommended. Although the state
programs operate differently now. the merger could be relatively smooth depending
on how it would be brought about. Most of the participating carriers are already
involved in multiple state programs anyways, so the collaboration of the five states
would almost simplify their policies.
One of the biggest hurdles would be government bureaucracy. It would take
the carriers and ciuTent wind pool board members to work together to draft legislation
for a regional wind pool. The Traveler’s Institute recommended in its Coastal Wind
Zone Plan that a government agency would be created to oversee aiid regulate a
regional wind pool (Traveler’s Institute, p5). This agency would also certify risk
models to be used by all of the states involved with the program. By pooling the risks
of multiple states, the wind pool would have the benefit of improved loss forecasting.
A regional windpool would eliminate the implicit tax, as pool would be made
up of only coastal property owners and would not be subsidized by property owners
living in low risk areas. It is a well-known fact that it is more expensive to live close
to the water, and the rates should be able to reflect the true risk of owning coastal
property. The way that the program works now,the insurers are assessed by their
percentage share of the market in the coastal state, and their rates for policyholders in
that state are affected by their involvement in the program. However, a resident of
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northern Mississippi has as little a chance of having their home hit by a hurricane as a
resident of Tennessee. Instead of spreading the risk to other residents of coastal states,
the risk should be spread nationally.
Next, the NFIP should be combined with this projected federal agency. Wind
and water damage by hurricanes is already difficult to differentiate because it is hard
to track the source of storm damages. By combining these coverages, claims servdces
would be simplified for both the insurer and the policyholder. It would also decrease
the amount of litigation after a major storm between policyholders and their insurers.
The federal government should change the NFIP so that it is similar to the program in
the UK and the wind pool programs in the US. By requiring private market
involvement, the costs to run the NFIP would be cut. However, the flood planning
and mapping services should still be offered by the government, but moved to the
new agency that would also oversee the regional wind pool.
Another important factor that needs change is risk mitigation. Construction
and upkeep standards for buildings aren’t well enough defined by the wind pools
currently. While most offer discounts for “good risks,” there isn’t enough
enforcement of building codes for all wind pool policyholders. There should be one
transparent set of codes that apply to all members of the wind pool, with state and
local adoption. These codes should incorporate new technology to create buildings
that can withstand stronger storms, and offer more discounts to these buildings. With
the increased federal backing of these programs, tax incentives could even be
discussed for participants in increased risk mitigation (Traveler’s Institute, p5).
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In order to create legislation that benefits the insurers as well as the
policyholders, the amount of transparency and communication between the two is
important. Jay Fishman, chairman and CEO of The Travelers Companies, Inc, stated
that "the right kind of public policy can do much good, and we hope state and federal
government policymakers will carefully consider their potential role in creating a
sustainable, uniform, market-based solution for the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts.”
(Travelers Institute. p8). With the NFIP coming up for renewal in the next few years
and the increased risk exposures placed in the hands of the state wind pools,
hopefully it can be recognized that a change in policy is needed.
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APPENDICES

A1. The ’Pen Most C'osll> Catastrophes. United States (1)(Si)ullious)

insured property losses

1

Aug. 2005

Murrieane Katrina

$ when

In 2010

occurred

dollars(2)

$41,100

$45,481

18,779

22,924

Eire. Explosion: World
2

Sep. 2001

Trade Center.
Pentagon terrorist attacks

Aug.1992

Hurricane Andrew

15,500

22,412

4

.Ian. 1994

Northridge, CA earthquake

12,500

17,318

5

Sep. 2008

Elurricane Ike

12.500

12.735

6

Oct. 2005

Hurricane Wilma

10,300

11,398

7

Aug. 2004

Hurricane Charley

7.475

8,548

8

Sep. 2004

Hurricane Ivan

7,110

8,130

9

Sep. 1989

Elurricane Hugo

4,195

6,678

10

Sep. 2005

Hurricane Rita

5,627

6,227

(1) Property coverage only. Does not include flood damage covered by the federally
administered National Flood Insurance Program. (2) Adjusted for inflation through 2010 by
ISO using the GDP implicit price deflator.
Source: The Property Claim Services(PCS)
unit of ISO, a Verisk Analytics company.
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A2; Hurricanes and Related Deaths in the United States, 1991-2011
i

Made landfall as
Deaths(I)
\' hurricane in the U.S.

II

1991
1992

4

1

18

1

27

1993

j

1994

0

8

1995

j

29

1996

0

59

1997

1

6

1998

10

j

23

1999

8

0

60

2000

8

0

4

2001

9

0

42

2002

4

2003

7

2

24

2004

9

6(2)

59

2005

6

7

1,518

2006

5

0

0

2007

6

: 2008

8

4(3)

41

2009

3

1(4)

6

; 2010

12

0

201 1

7

1

5

1
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(1) Includes fatalities from high winds of less than hurricane force from tropical
storms. (2) One hurricane (Alex) is considered a strike but not technically a
landfall. (3) Includes one hurricane (Hanna) which made landfall as a tropical
storm. (4) Hurricane Ida, which made landfall as a tropical stomi.l ' Source:
Insurance Information Institute from data supplied by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane
Center.
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A3; Top Three Slates By Intlalion Adjusted Catastrophe Losses, 1980-2010(1)
(201 0$ Billions)
Texas
$42.3
11.27o
Florida
$62.6
16.57o«

Louisiana
$36.7

I

9.77o

t -

c

.F ‘
Total: $379.1 billion

(l) Adjusted for intlation by ISO using the GDP implicit price deflator. Percentages do not sum
to 100 because of rounding.
Source: The Property Claim Services(PCS) unit of ISO, a Verisk Analytics company
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A4; MWUA Limits By Occupancy (As Of 10/31 '2010)

Commercial
6%
. $455,816,293

/
/
/
!

I

Residential
o 94%
$6,568,411,870

Source: MWUA Website: http://\v\v\v.msplans.com/mwua/
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A5: N4ississippi Count>- Map
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A6: MWUA 2011 Reinsurance Program
100 Year
P,VL

$65Iv1 jcs S75QMAnnuaI Aggregate Uniit^RPPPurchased).

S772Mavg
(AIR-RMS)

$150M xs $600M Annual Aggregate Limit(RPP Purchased)
96.57% Treaty Markets
3.43% Capital Markets
$400M XS S200M Annual Aggregate Limit(RPP Purchased)
except $19.25M per Occurrence cover
82.31% DireclOTreaty Markets
1 / .l)/o Capital Markets
0.19% co-insured
$75M xs $125M per occurrence / $1 SOM Annual Aggregate
71.67% Direct Markets/10% Capital Markets/18.33% co-insured
$50M xs $75M per occurrence
29% co-insured
$15M xs $60M per occurrence -50% co-insured
$30M xs $30M per occurrence
$15M xs $15M per occurrence
$15M Retention
Source: MWUA Website: hUp://\v\v\v.msplans.com/mwua/
Limits in Force of 7,024,288,163 as of November 2010
100 year PML based on Estimated Limits in Force of $7.3b during2011 Wind
Season
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A7: MWUA Limits by Construction (as of 10/31/2010)
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A8: MWUA Limits by County [as of 10/31/2010)
3,121.WS.«S

,V

V

i

t

i.

U
2
jM

>

●CS.'JSJ

1

■V

:T$.?M.767
i&.s;
C<rO.’J.«

5S,276,7S5

3
M. 4. *

.

t‘J"K.O(.k

HjrrWT

Source; MWUA Website: http:/A\'\\av.msplans.coni/m\vua/

53
i

iiHWO

Ptiri S vf

A9: Limits by Construction [as of 10/31/2010]
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AlO: Traditional Insurance, Reinsurance and Retrocessional Transactions
Insurance
coverage
Firm

Pr»mlum
Lonpaymente

Retrace sslonal
coverage

Reinsurance
coverage
Primary
insurer

Premium
r
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Source: GAO Analysis
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Premium

Rtfnsurer
#1

i ^

Uetpqrmanls

Reinsufer
K

All: Application Process for a Policyholder

Agent

I

r

Water

Wind

r

r
Voluntary
Market
I

Umbrella
Policy

State
Windpool

I
BPP Special
Form
Endorsement
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NFIP

Excess Flood

1

A12: Comparison of Southeastern State Wind Pool Programs
I

Background

Limits

Risk Financing

Alabama-

- Founded in 1971 to
offer fire and

Residential- $500,000;
Commercial-$1 million

Alabama Insurance

extended coverage in
coastal counties

-Purchases
reinsurance with 60%
ofrevenues
-Assessments would
cover the firsts100m
of losses, reinsurance
covers the excess
$335m

State Program

Underwriting
Association(AIUA)

Florida-

- Is a small program
with only 12,500
policies as of July
2009
- Created in 2002
through a
combination of state

Citizen’s Property
Insurance
Corporation
(Citizens)

LouisianaLouisiana Citizens
Property Insurance
Corporation
(Citizens)

MississippiMississippi
Windstorm
Underwriting
Association
(MWUA)

TexasTexas Windstorm
Insurance
Association

Residential- $2 million;
Commercial-$1 million

program, the Florida
Hurricane

programs
-Originally only
granted policies to
applicants denied by
the private market, is
the largest property
writer in FL
- Louisiana’s wind
pool and FAIR plan
were combined in
2004 to create
Citizens
-Had 129,000
policies in 2009,
with $27 billion in
insured value
- Originally
established in 1987,
modified by HB1500
in 2007 to its current
form
- Insures around
46,000 homes in 6
coastal counties111

- Founded in 1971
and was merged with
a FAIR program in
2003
- Faced accusations
of underpaying
claims and deceiving
policyholders after
Hurricane Ike

- Florida also has its
own reinsurance

Risk Mitigation
- Currently has
little risk
mitigation
programs and
ranks low on
strength ofstate
building codes
- Few risk
mitigation
discounts are
available to

Catastrophe Fund
- Has the ability to
charge an emergency
assessment in the
case of claims
exceeding surplus

policyholders

Residential- $750,000
for buildings, $375,000
for personal property;
Commercial- $5 million
building, $2 million
contents

- Is required to charge
higher rates than the
private market to
eliminate competition
- In 2012, issued
$100ni of catastrophe
bonds” to repay
deficit from Katrina

- Policyholders
have access to
tax credits and
incentives

Residential-$I million
for building, $250,000
for contents;
Commercial-$1 million

-Purchased $815 m
ofreinsurance

- Is planning on
expanding risk
mitigation
discounts and

Residential- $1.8
million;
Commercial- $4.4
million
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coverage in London
- As of2011, retains
up to $15m and is coinsured past the $60m

programs
- Plans to

limif

increase clarity
of building code
standards

- Established a
Catastrophe Reserve
Trust Fund(CRTF)in
1993 for excess
revenue
- Issues a layer of
securities up to $lbn
-Let its reinsurance
policy lapse in spring
2009

- Requires a
building
inspection,
applicants who
fail can pay
more premium
and aren’t
eligible for risk
mitigation
discounts
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